All federal simulations and animations are inconsistent with the radar data from the night of the crash. This fact has been communicated to Congressman Duncan, Chair of the House Aviation Subcommittee through a liaison on October 4, 1999. Then, in January of 2000, the NTSB completed a follow-up report to their simulation exhibit, which analyzed the radar data by conducting an error analysis[1].

This new NTSB report shows that all NTSB simulations fall outside of the error bars of the East-West versus Time graphs, just as was stated to Honorable Duncan three months prior. But even though the NTSB has shown that its own simulations do not match the radar data, this new report continues to support simulations that show Flight 800 climbing a maximum of 3,000 feet after the initiating event[1].

The technical information presented below may be difficult to apprehend in a first reading, but the implications are simple: 1) If Flight 800 climbed at all, it was substantially less than the maximum of 3,000 feet stated by the NTSB; and 2) the official crash sequence is unable to explain a streak of light that, according to 96 eyewitnesses, rose from the surface and exploded at Flight 800's altitude.

Each simulation presented in NTSB Exhibit 22C and its latest addendum (Exhibit 22D) is based upon the aerodynamic effects caused by the loss of the forward fuselage[1, 2]. Inherent in these simulations is the assumption that the only effect from a catastrophic center wing tank explosion was a clean break of the nose section from the rest of the fuselage. There is no mention of the uncertainty surrounding aerodynamic effects caused by other types of damage and structural failure

A case and point is the disregard of the severe damage to the left wing. If this damage occurred early in the crash sequence, it may have significantly affected the flight path. To date, investigators are not certain when this damage occurred or even how it occurred. But the recovery location of wing pieces (in the early debris field or "red area") indicates that this damage occurred at the beginning of the crash sequence.

NTSB Exhibit 18A[3]: "Pieces of internal and external wing structure were recovered from the red area during recent trawling operations and are under review."

However, in the simulation exhibit, the wings are assumed to be in perfect condition and allowed to carry the plane over one thousand feet in altitude. In fact, no possible damage to the plane other than the absence of its front section is factored into these simulations--damage that would likely create uncertainties in the flight characteristics of TWA Flight 800. These uncertainties may allow the possibility that Flight 800 immediately rolled left, right or even descended, rather than climbing several thousand feet.

In effect, the NTSB simulations represent the flight characteristics of a 747 after having its front section seamlessly removed, in apparent conflict with the condition of the reconstructed wreckage and debris field data.

To better understand the data analysis conducted by the NTSB, familiarity with position versus time plots is helpful. From these plots, airspeed can be calculated easily. As an example of this, Figure 1 (below) shows a position versus time plot of two cars traveling at different speeds. The inclination of each line (its slope) is directly related to the car's speed. In Figure 1, we see that car A is traveling faster than car B, simply by noticing that the slope of the line representing car A is steeper than that representing car B.

Figure 1: Position versus Time Plot of two cars traveling at different speeds. Note that the slope of the line representing the faster vehicle (car A) is steeper than that of the slower vehicle (car B).

The federal crash sequence of TWA Flight 800 involves a "zoom-climb," which describes an exchange of airspeed for altitude. For a simplistic look at data representing a zoom-climb, Figure 2 (below) shows two scenarios for aircraft flight. One assumes horizontal flight with constant airspeed, and the other, a 30 degree zoom-climb. This plot neglects air resistance in order to emphasize the effect of a zoom-climb. Note that after 4 seconds of flight, the aircraft performing a zoom-climb has reduced its speed by 173 mph. This reduction in airspeed has been exchanged for altitude, as is the case during all zoom-climbs. If Flight 800 performed a zoom-climb, the radar data must show a similar reduction in airspeed.

Figure 2: Distance vs. Time plot of a zoom-climb versus level flight with constant air speed.

Figure 2 represents two very basic simulations. The lower line characterizes a zoom-climb. It's airspeed is reduced as its altitude increases. The upper line shows no change in airspeed over 10 seconds, and is therefore not performing a zoom-climb. As is shown in the next section (Figure 3), there is no drastic change in Flight 800's airspeed during the first 13 seconds after losing electrical power, which means the following: 1) Flight 800 was not performing a zoom-climb during this time interval; and 2) the federal crash scenario, which is based upon a zoom-climb during this time period, is invalid.

Figure 2 (above) was created and plotted by a computer. Assumptions were integrated into these simulations which controlled their final appearance in the figure. If data existed with which these simulations could be compared, such as radar data, one scenario may fit the data better than another. And this is exactly the case for TWA Flight 800. Radar data does exist with which any simulation may be compared. Such a comparison shows that Flight 800 may not have climbed at all, and surely did not perform a 3,000 foot zoom-climb as depicted in federal animations.

Radar sites recorded the horizontal flight path of many commercial airliners on the day Flight 800 was lost. Data from three of these sites were used by NTSB analysts to track the wreckage of TWA Flight 800 as it fell into the ocean[4]. At the same time, and separately, NTSB investigators created simulations based upon assumptions and speculation concerning the flight characteristics of a 747 after catastrophic failure[2]. Results from these simulations conflict with the radar data, which may indicate that the assumptions made by federal investigators are invalid.

Figure 3: NTSB radar plot from Exhibit 13A with the following data overlaid: the statistical mean (average) of the three radar sites used by the NTSB to track the main wreckage and two NTSB simulations from Exhibit 22C.

In Figure 3, it can be seen that the NTSB simulation data does not fit the radar data. The circled data points represent the radar returns from the main wreckage, as indicated by NTSB radar experts in Exhibit 13A. Flight 800 lost electrical power at 08:31:12 DST, which corresponds to 1872 seconds in Figure 3. Ten seconds later (1882), the NTSB simulations show that the East-West airspeed dropped by nearly 200 knots due to the proposed zoom-climb. The radar data, however, indicates the airspeed being significantly higher at this time, and therefore conflicts with the zoom-climb theory. As time continues, it is evident that the simulation data is inconsistent with nearly every radar data point. Therefore, the radar data is hard evidence against the zoom-climb depicted in NTSB simulations.

With the federal zoom-climb scenario proven invalid through comparison with the radar data, investigators are left with no comprehensive explanation of the eyewitness evidence. Nearly 200 eyewitnesses described a streak of light or flare-like object traverse the sky and explode. Instead of reviewing the eyewitness evidence at the NTSB public hearing in Baltimore on December 8, 1997, the NTSB canceled any discussion related to eyewitnesses only three days prior to its commencement[5].

Statements made by eyewitnesses just prior to the NTSB hearings challenged the validity of the zoom-climb hypothesis, first publicized at the FBI November 18, 1997 press conference in the form of a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) animation. Eyewitnesses to the Flight 800 tragedy watched the CIA animation and were asked to comment on its consistency with their observations.

Witness Darrel Miron (12/3/97 phone interview):: "That's total fabrication."

Witness Paul Runyan (12/4,6/97 phone interviews): "Yeah right, coming off the water...What I saw was going up from the surface, like a rising flare."

From the above witness statements, it was clearly convenient for federal investigators who were pushing the zoom-climb theory to have all eyewitness testimony and discussion banned from the NTSB hearings.

And now, statements by NTSB officials have begun to minimize the value of the over 700 eyewitnesses who observed the tragedy.

Reuters (3/21/00): "Air safety investigators have concluded that witness accounts of the 1996 explosion of a TWA jumbo jet off Long Island, New York, are of little use in their nearly completed probe of the crash."

However, NTSB Witness Group Exhibit 4A shows striking similarities in eyewitness accounts. Out of 102 eyewitnesses who reported the origin of a streak of light, 94 % are consistent with one another.

NTSB Exhibit 4A[6]: "Of the 183 who observed a streak of light, 102 gave information about the origin of the streak. Six said the streak originated from the air, and 96 said that it originated from the surface."

Such overwhelming statistics should be deemed useful by investigators of the TWA Flight 800 tragedy. The 96 eyewitnesses who reported the origin of the streak of light to be on the surface should have been re-interviewed by NTSB investigators long ago. Instead, the NTSB banned all public discussion with the eyewitnesses, criticized the FBI for its conduct during eyewitness interviews[7], and now dismisses the 755 eyewitnesses "of little use" in its own probe of the tragedy.

Some implications of the discrepancies between the simulation and radar data are that the official crash scenario is flawed, the zoom-climb postulated by the NTSB is at least, highly exaggerated, and that the CIA scenario that proposes an even higher zoom-climb is more erroneous.

There are multiple unfortunate consequences of this careless research conducted by federal investigators. The most unfortunate, however, was the production of animations based on these simulations. These animations were nationally televised many times, in an attempt to show the world what the eyewitnesses "really" saw. And ironically, the most recognizable animation (CIA animation) was also the most inaccurate.

The CIA spent $40,000.00[8] to produce an animation with professional graphics, dramatic music, and narration[9]. The special effects and audio made it look and sound convincing, while being well suited for broadcast by the major networks. However, it was merely a state of the art representation of an invalid scenario.

As shown above, the maximum gain in altitude calculated by NTSB simulations is far too high, since it falls well short of the radar data, in position and speed. Any zoom-climb scenario showing gains in altitude above this amount will only be more inaccurate. Incredibly, the CIA scenario contains a gain in altitude twice of what the NTSB determined to be the maximum in Exhibit 22C.

Federal researchers did not base their simulations on the hard radar data. Instead, speculative variables concerning the flight characteristics of a 747 after a violent explosion were used to direct a flight path during steered simulations. Since it is now known that the radar data conflicts with each simulation, investigators should begin to question their original assumptions upon which the simulations were based.

An object most likely did ascend and explode, as indicated by the eyewitnesses. A statistical analysis of eyewitness reports overwhelmingly supports this contention. But, the radar evidence discounts NTSB claims of a zoom-climb crash scenario to explain this ascending object. Ironically, in two recent reports, the NTSB supports the zoom-climb scenario[1] and dismisses the eyewitness evidence[10].

NTSB Exhibit 13A

NTSB Exhibit 22C

Evidence the Main Wreckage Didn't Climb

For a Better Understanding of Simulation Data

FIRO Review of Exhibit 22D

Eyewitness Evidence

Altitude Adjustments